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#### This is a new age of Yellow Peril. Paranoia has been sutured to the social and political that ignites Asian violence to fuel American exceptionalism. This establishes a positive feedback loop that proliferates orientalist tropes that conflates Yellow Peril as the pathological death knell to Whiteness.

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China appears to be the greatest challenge facing the world today. A strategic anxiety, the New China Scare, has surfaced. Such fears, almost rising to phobias, are not new. They have been seen regularly throughout history in various clothes whenever a power transition was underway. In more recent times, such fears started with the red scare, the fear of the rise of Bolshevism. This was followed by European fears of the USA becoming dominant in the period of reconstruction after WW2. Later, in the late 1950, following the spectacular technological rise of Japan, the Yellow Peril emerged in the USA for the second time. Today we are encountering the third Yellow Peril – even though it originally started already at the mid19th in the USA as a fear of Chinese immigrants. Following 9/11, the obsession with terrorism commenced similarly to earlier anti-communist hysteria in the country. The Trump Administration has now started a trade war with China as part of the inward-looking economic and nationalist policies of America First. An opportunity has been created to replace America’s presence in the global arena as a consequence. It is not by chance that a trade war is brewing at a time when China is celebrating 40 years of being open to the world and becoming a leader in certain technologies. What is really underway is a technology war. After China’s spectacular growth, it is now time for states to begin thinking about what this actually means to each of them, what it means to their region, and to the world generally. Trump’s trade war against China may be seen as a way of rectifying some of the deficiencies of the existing Pax Americana. It is thus high time to reflect on whether China’s growth threatens the world’s development and stability (system) or is benefiting the partner countries. The awareness that China is not only a country with a big economy, but also one that has growing military strength coupled with geo-strategic ambitions, is making a difference in both real life and theory2. World power is obviously going back to Asia. The winners will be those able to take advantage of this (Prestowitz, 2005). According to Porter, “the biggest risk is not that China will succeed in rising to become an economic superpower. The biggest risk is that it will fail” (Porter, 2005). It is hence no surprise that China is increasingly seen as a threat. Paranoia has been carved into mind-sets not only for the country’s size, but also for the different Chinese civilisation which for the Western world is a strange combination of culture, a particular type of state-controlled economy and state socialism/communism. The purpose of this article is therefore to answer two research questions. First, are these fears justifiable or overblown, with concerns being based on the differences in the roots of civilisation, on cultural fears? Second, what are these differences, if any at all, and can we detect any similarities among them? The article is structured as follows. We first look at the theoretical framework of such challenges/fears, then consider each fear in chronological order in sections 2 and 3. The fourth section seeks to identify differences/ similarities while the last sections outlines some policy-related conclusions. Theoretical Framework The article addresses the manner in which views/perceptions3 of different global challenges have evolved in recent history. Accordingly, the analysis concentrates more on qualitative data and attitudes along with the context in which they are created because, as implied by Kant’s “transcendental idealism”, it is appearances and perceptions, not the reality that truly matters. In such qualitative analysis, social psychology is becoming ever more important. It sees challenges as a positive reaction to perceived fear4, regarded as one of the basic emotions. “The culture of fear5 of the other seems to be a forceful mechanism of social and political indoctrination for human beings« (Skoll and Korstanje, 2013). It has played and continues to play a central role in driving popular fears to make the masses do, or not do, what the elite desires. Especially in the twenty-first century, described as uncertain and unpredictable, risky VUCA (vulnerability, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity), we seem to engage ever more frequently with various issues through a narrative of fear as a vital instrument of propaganda or, to borrow Bernays’ expression, engineering of consent (1969). People develop specific fears as a result of what they have learned, but the cause might also be an irrational, unconscious fear of the unknown6. Moreover, individual fears can grow into fears of a whole group or can as well arise from the fears held by a whole group usually manifested as stereotyping erroneously, of an entire nation. When problems mount in society, the specific cultural and historical context involved can fuel the stereotyping of entire nations as people look for the causes of such problems in others, in foreigners. They start to blame (scapegoat) them for job insecurity, problems with healthcare, low wages, the lack of safety nets etc. In a culture of fear, domestic frustrations are transferred to foreign enemies. A crisis is a typical example of when such prejudicial attitudes are created, although stereotypes can also be built to make it easier to process limited information and degrade others in order to magnify one’s own image. This phenomenon is more common when little is known about others or it is hard to learn about them due to being located far away (the distance factor). Such stereotypes impede our ability to objectively assess data/processes, assuming that stereotypes, presenting different picture, are believed to be true. Our readiness and ability to think critically and predict the behaviour of others is thereby weakened. All of these elements are visible in all the perils we analyse here, particularly in the yellow scares. People like to rely on stereotypes that validate their already held opinion more than trying to evaluate each situation on its own, by looking at data. They tend to select information sources that suit their ideological orientation and ignore other sources or contrary opinions. In a way, stereotypes are an instrument of excuses. After defining the role played by fear, we must examine more quantitative data to shed light on what creates such fears. Realism is the leading theory explaining sources of power as it mainly relies on material capabilities and relative economic and military power. Apart from neglecting the role of domestic beliefs, this may be its biggest shortcoming in view of the rising importance of soft power.. According to mainstream realism,7 countries compete with each other as they pursue their national interests in the struggle for power in anarchic international relations. The power of a state depends on what it is actually based on and the ways in which it is exercised. Seeking hegemony is therefore the result because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to acquire power at the expense of rivals. States are concerned with the accumulation of relative power as they will not be content with relative security by relying on other states (see Snyder, 2002). Such offensive realism can thus explain the emerging role of China as it aspires to obtain a more prominent role in international relations. On the other hand, defensive realism can explain the USA as it struggles to retain its current dominance, which is proving more important than increasing its power. To properly understand the rise of China today, it is essential to look beyond realism, to also consider the soft power8 which is growing in importance in a VUCA world. However, the capacity to influence others means possessing resources like population, land, natural resources, economy, armed forces, and political stability (Nye and Welch, 2014). Soft and hard power are not alternatives, but complements. In the words of Melissen, “the wheels of hard power can only function smoothly with the lubricant of soft power” (Ham, 2005). Lacking in soft power, China has started to intensively use soft power to complement its hard power based on six pillars: cultural attractiveness, political values, development model, international institutions, international image, and economic temptation (Li and Worm, 2010). The whole story about attitudes to the leading or aspiring global players is about power and its transition. Power transition theory is in fact a version of the power balance theory, a very popular theory of international relations that interprets the causes of conflict (Haas, 1953; Sheehan, 1996; Waltz, 1979). It stems from the hierarchical nature of international relations in which the most powerful countries define the rules of the game. As rival countries acquire power, the chances of war increase (Hillebrand, 2010: 12).9 The old powers’ resistance to the erosion of their position leads us to the second group of theories, the theory of hegemon. Hegemonic stability theory (THS) argues that an asymmetric system10 is probably more stable; if one country dominates, it is a hegemon. The hegemon dominates the rules of the game and with the help of military dominance creates certain public goods in the form of security and economic stability. The erosion of this role can therefore stifle the world system and throw its stability off balance. The smaller the difference in power between the leading and rival states, the greater the likelihood of conflict (Kugler and Organski, 1989) with the upcoming forces because the incumbent power is unwilling to leave its prime position11; the so-called Thucydides trap12 (Allison, 2017). “But it doesn’t have to be« (ibid. 2017) Allison adds, although Kugler (2006) believes that China’s growing power over the USA is greatly increasing the chances of war in the next few decades. Emmott states “that the USA should not fear falling into a Thucydides trap because the historical analogy of England, Germany and WW2 is dissimilar to East Asia today. Germany overtook Britain in the 1900s, while China will not overtake the US for decades” (Emmott, 2009). According to China’s plans, this could happen upon the 100-year anniversary of their country in 2049. However, China is still far from closing the gap on all sources of power and thus the chances of war are lower. The power transition is not simply a political, geopolitical or economic problem, but a psychological one. The leading nations pride is hurt13 and it therefore attempts to block the emergence of any new power(s). The third group of relevant theories deals with different civilisation models since views are firmly embedded in the culture of the observer. Ethnocentrism is a worldview that regards Western culture and way of thinking as something extraordinary, placing it in the centre of the world14. Other cultures are viewed as different, backward, despotic-undemocratic, sometimes even barbaric or racist. It is assumed that the entire world should be modelled on Western values that are seen as universal, always correct, while others are uncivilised barbarians (see Plummer, 2010: 214). “It is about understanding the ideas and practices of another culture with the criteria of our own” (Giddens, 1997). Eurocentrism has been built on an ethnocentric ideological construct approach, locating Europe in the world’s epicentre. It interprets the history of the world as its own history. One’s identity develops on the basis of difference from others, difference in the degree of rationality; we are rational and others are irrational. The only possible conclusion is – European civilisation is superior. According to Amin, this is the ideology of the modern capitalist world (2009). Mastnak sees in Eurocentrism “a colonialist worldview, an inspiration for the European conquest and subjugation of the world and the justification of that conquest and rule” (Južnič, 2009: 183–184). The recently developed ethno-nationalism, manifested in populism and every country first policies has its roots in such theories. It also gives rise to orientalism as a view of the Middle East and, more broadly, of Eastern civilisations (Said, 1996). The mythology of enemies other than us is attributed to “sub- or inhuman ethnic and racial traits”. It is not about attitudes to individuals, but about a group of people who, as a last resort, have evil purposes attributed to them (conspiracy theory) in the sense of good versus bad. The responsibility for our own problems is shifted over to strangers (the ideology of economic nationalism), often expanding into overt populist-tinged chauvinism/racism and xenophobia. Refugees/migrants are increasingly the scapegoats for the ever worse position of those affected by technical progress and globalization (GLO), together with rising imports from China15. The populist revolt against the enormous upsurge in Chinese exports which, on top of the GLO, is seen as the biggest culprit for the lost jobs and deindustrialisation of the West. Inglehart and Norris contend this revolt is largely based on cultural, not economic factors (see Freund et al. 2017). Trump’s protectionism is also motivated by the incorrect assumption that China is to blame for the large US trade deficit.16 A chronology of fears The Red Scare The very first red scare in the USA came after the Paris Commune of 1871 while the second one followed the October Bolshevik revolution in Russia. It centred on the perceived threat of the American labour movement, anarchist revolution and political radicalism. The Third Red Scare came directly after WW2, fuelled at home by the perception of national or foreign communists infiltrating or subverting American society and, as the external factor, by the Soviet Union’s growing role in the world. A new bogeyman, ‘The Red Menace’, was portrayed as being everywhere. Communists were demonised. The Red Scare reached its peak between 1950 and 1954 during ‘McCarthyism’. The pursuit of allegedly communist infiltrators in American society had begun. Domestic communism was seen an enemy of apocalyptic proportions. When the Soviets developed an atomic bomb, fear levels intensified, just like during the Cuban crisis or when in 1957 the Soviets sent “Lajka” the dog into space on Sputnik 1. American pride was wounded then like it is now, faced with a decline in its global leadership. As a rule, such fears manifest as various conspiracy theories to make them become more tangible and more persuasive from the point of view of their generators. After the transition, Russia’s role in the world has been shrinking. Further, like all autocratic regimes, Russia should eventually transition to a marketdriven democracy (Ikenberry, 2014) meaning that it is less of a concern. Nevertheless, fear of Russia is again on the rise, mainly based on deep distrust and value-based concerns. Putin has spoken of the “offensive mistrust of the West about Russia” (Petrič, 2018: 471). American Challenge; Europe The demolished Europe, wrote J. J. Servain-Schreiber in his bestseller (1967/69), is under threat from the Americans. The USA was pictured as “enslaving” Europe, becoming an economic colony based on massive inflows of American investment funds. He believed that Europe, lagging behind the USA on all fronts (management, technology, research) was in a silent economic war. He spoke of “American attackers” in the form of US multinational companies, about the collapse of Europe. Yet Schreiber did not stop just with describing the situation. He helped revive French nationalism (similar to today’s populist movements). Later, he taught at Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, 1984–1995) and became chairman of Le Center Mondial in Paris that promoted the development of computer and information technologies. In 1985, he told President Mitterrand he was resigning because the French government had wanted to procure French equipment for France’s schools instead of buying the computers from an American corporation (see Rubner, 1990: 272). Schreiber’s intellectual honesty and consistency may thus be questioned. To conclude, these fears were also overblown. Yellow Peril I The Yellow Peril has seen two waves in the USA. The First Peril was directed against Chinese workers at the end of the 1880s. Rather than addressing the economic aspect of immigration, in 1882 anti-Asian propaganda encouraged the federal government to pass the Chinese Exclusion Act, making the immigration of Chinese labourers to the USA unlawful and preventing them from obtaining citizenship. Although this Act was repealed in 1943, anti-Asian sentiment/propaganda remained strong in the country. Later, following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, it was directed at Japanese-Americans, portrayed in ways very similar to the 19th century Chinese immigrants. Yellow Peril propaganda was based on the supposedly lower intelligence or subhuman qualities of Japanese people (see White, 2019). Yellow Peril II; Japan The second wave of the Yellow Peril came in 1960 during the Japanese miracle (10.5% average GDP growth in 1950–1973). Japan’s share of world GDP had risen from 2–3 percent to 10 percent. The Japanese miracle was largely due to the creative imitation of Western technology and introduction of new production methods (lean production). Schreiber (1980) was fascinated by Japan’s automotive industry and automation, robotisation and computer science. This miracle was initially facilitated by the possibility of directing all its resources for development (Japan was not allowed to spend on the army). Second, it was due to the inventiveness and working habits of the Japanese people and the systematic strategic trade and industrial policy. The Japanese began to buy property in Manhattan and acquired American ‘jewels’ (like Rockefeller Center in Manhattan, Firestone Tire and Rubber, Columbia Pictures or the Pebble Beach Golf Course). It was predicted that Japan might already overtake the USA by GDP pc in 1985. Not surprisingly, Vogel (1979) wrote the book: Japan as Number One. This fear indeed had both economic and cultural roots given that American pride and self-confidence had been dented. The Japanese had taken the lead in sectors previously the cause of American pride (automotive industry). Still, such fears again proved to be overblown since Japan’s yellow miracle was followed by very low growth and then by the lost century. Imitation can obviously be a double-edged sword; those imitated feel threatened, while simultaneously, by wanting to have what the imitated have, the imitators themselves begin to be troubled by doubts and lose their self-respect. The French philosopher Girard says this leads to hostilities and a feeling of being endangered. Yellow Peril III: China’s Contemporary Challenge Today’s yellow peril concerns the big challenge China brings to the whole international system after its spectacular rise in the last 40 years. In less than 30 years, China had become the world’s second-largest economy by 2001. The first signs of the modern fear of China emerged in December 2004, the last month in which The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) remained in force but was set to expire by the end of the year under a World Trade Organization (WTO) decision. Developed countries soon barricaded themselves off from China and the threat of becoming flooded with its textile products. The challenge with China is underpinned by the size of its economy and by it rivalling the USA as the dominant power. China is already the world’s largest economy in population and trade-volume terms. Nominally, in 2017 China’s GDP amounted to 64 percent of US GDP. In 2014, it overtook the USA in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) to become the world’s biggest economy (Bergsten, 2018, 2). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that China will overtake the US (at 2017 market rates) in 2030 (IMF, 2018). Yet, according to the index of economic strength, China still lags 12.3 percent behind the USA. Still, as early as 2030 it may become the leading economic power, holding an 18% share while that of the USA is projected to fall (1973–2030) from 16.3 percent to 10.2 percent (Subramanian, 2011). These economic indicators should be stressed because there is a strong long-term correlation between economic capability, military power and a country’s position in the global power system. “Therefore, the hegemon (either US or China) will be in a weaker position than before /… /. It should be though remembered that, historically, China’s leading role is a natural position, since China lost its leading position by Britain only in the 19th century, and after the WW2, when US has taken over from the latter” (van Bergeijk, 2018: 15). One of the more controversial economic accusations and economic fears underlying the challenge posed by China is that it systematically imitates17 and ‘steals’ intellectual property (IP)18 and forces foreign companies to transfer their technology to Chinese companies. Imitation is partly the result of admiration and resistance to Western ideas following the Century of Humiliation, the “Opium war which marked the beginning of China’s collapse and dismemberment at the hands of foreign powers” (see Davis and Rašković, 2017: 8). A fundamental goal of contemporary Chinese politics is to do all that is needed to ensure this never happens again. It nevertheless seems that this accusation is overblown. Namely, in the latest US-China Business Council Member Survey, just 5 percent of respondents reported having been asked to transfer technology to China, and this concern was ranked 24 out of the top 27 challenges facing foreign companies (Huang and Smith, 2019). At the same time, certain problematic imitation activities (trade, foreign investment, licensing, international research collaboration, reverse engineering) are legitimate and voluntary. Moreover, the situation in the area of IP rights is now changing. Premier Li Keqiang stated that “strengthening IP protection is strategic and vital for strengthening the socialist market economy” (Reuters, 2017). In view of the ambitious plans to transform China from a “large manufacturing country” into a “powerful manufacturing country” by 2025 and a “leading global producer” by 2049 (“Made in China” and plans for the PRC’s 100th anniversary in 2049), it may be expected that China will become a leader in many technology-driven activities. Simultaneously, the country seeks to strengthen the protection of IP not so much due to external pressures but under the internal pressure of its own companies that desire greater protection for their patents. The more domestic firms become innovative, the more they are seeking to protect their IP rights19. China is a global leader in technologies such as e-commerce, artificial intelligence, fintech, high-speed trains, renewable energy, and electric cars. Companies like Alibaba, Didi Chuxing, Huawei and Tencent are operating at the global technology frontier (World Bank, 2019: xvii). The third economic fear relates to the huge rise of Chinese investments, especially their acquisition of technology-leading companies (Godement et al., 2017). This opens the door not only to economic but political influence and creates potential for the Chinese ‘divide and rule’ policy. Public opinion is becoming more hostile (Grant and Barysch, 2008) but oscillating between “China saving Europe” and “China taking over Europe” (Shambaugh, 2013). The world fears the transfer of Chinese management patterns or values wherever their companies make investments. Past experience shows evidence of both implications; strong adaptations to local cultures (particularly in industrial countries) but also the imposition of its own management style and working habits (Africa) or a combination of these two strategies, a kind of Yin-Yang cultural approach treating different countries/firms/people differently. The EU is encountering China’s ever more aggressive policy of influencing more flexible and less critical positions in China (market economy status, democracy). The 17+1 initiative is such a strategy that could create splits within the EU, making some members the ‘fifth column’ of China in the EU. It is thus little wonder that alarm bells have started ringing over China’s ability to translate its economic power into attempts to undermine Europe’s unified policy on China. Apart from hard economic data, soft power factors should also be considered. Here, China’s position is still weak despite all the efforts it has been making in public diplomacy recently. Chinese public diplomacy these days is replacing the previous “charm offensive” strategy (Kurlantzick, 2007: 6) aimed at neutralising the “theory of threats” and improving China’s global reputation (Tai-Ting Liu, Tony, 2019: 77). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may also be regarded as an instrument of soft power. Today’s paranoia, in the face of a rapidly growing and increasingly ambitious China, is obviously principally rooted in the enormity of the Chinese economy. Second, a fear of its difference, exotics, is entailed; third, of its leading role in the world and, finally, the fear of economic intelligence, of espionage, as a threat to security. “In the name of national security, America is treating Chinese students and scholars as a new ‘yellow peril’, in a witch-hunt worthy of Senator Joseph McCarthy” (The Economist, 2019, 13 July: 52). The fear of the difference is merging with the fear of potential political interference in the economy via the large share of state-controlled firms20. The biggest distinction is therefore that China is a different civilisation, a communist, centralised and authoritarian state. It has different values and religious beliefs. The challenge brought by Chinese is thus different. Three potential scenarios arise. First, that China’s position will start to be eroded if it becomes unable to cope with the accumulated problems of its own rapid growth and the fact it has not anticipated the accompanying problems21, including all the political challenges, the necessary democratisation of the political system, and providing more human rights in the long run22. China will encounter Rodrik’s trilemma (2011) regarding how to accommodate its three pillars: GLO, sovereignty and democracy23. This scenario entails considerable internal instability and negative implications for world stability, clearly not in the interest of any of us. An international implication of such a stagnant scenario might be China adopting a more aggressive foreign policy aimed at maintaining support at home while ratcheting up repression against any signs of dissent at home. A more likely scenario is that China will take on a leading role in many areas, especially the economy, thereby beginning to change the world’s structure in either the direction of Pax Sinica or a multilateral system with China as one of the leading powers (the third scenario) in a world of cooperation and competition among the great powers. The question is whether China wishes to abolish the capitalist world order or to simply form a nonhegemonic capitalist world order in which it will have more opportunities for development. According to Hočevar (2019, 15), it seems more that “China does not undermine the capitalist world order, but rather tries to challenge the US position in the existing capitalist world order in order to form a non-hegemonistic capitalist world order”. He may be right for now, but the situation could change when China achieves a more hegemonistic position. History shows that power corrupts and aspirations can, along the way, be broadened, such as to shape the world so as to better suit its own (ideological) design (albeit the changes will be gradual). Economic success is namely enhancing China’s self-confidence, courage and opportunities to exercise its interests. It appears obvious that the US hegemony will come to an end, thereby jeopardising the stability of the system in line with the theory of hegemonic stability. The erosion of this role could thus endanger the existing global system’s functioning, throwing its stability off balance. Differences and similarities in the above perils Is there a common denominator to these fears, eclipsing popular apocalyptic literature, about dangerous aliens threatening our world, or are they more idiosyncratic? Both are correct; there are similarities and differences. Four of the most obvious similarities are as follows. The first is the fear of the growing economic size of the challengers while the second is the fear of external threats, of dangerous aliens that endanger our white world mostly because they are different and not so much because they are economically or technologically threatening. Economic concerns have gradually turned into more ideological, cultural, religious, civilisational or even racist fears. They appear as mythology regarding an enemy, someone that threatens us because they are different, which is not ours. The third group relates to the second but is ideologically based (red and yellow scare III) and the last one relates to the changing international context. The first type of fear (growing economic power) primarily relates to the American challenge to Europe after WW2, and today’s China threat also manifested in Trump’s America First policy. The Japanese yellow peril in the 1960/1970s was also economically based, but dissimilar in that the Japanese are culturally different. Among the analysed economic challenges, the biggest quantitative difference is the size and geostrategic role/ambition. Japan’s challenge in the 1970s was confined to economic/technological power (Japan’s GDP was 9 times smaller than that of the USA, whereas China’s GDP today is already 70% of US GDP). The specifics of the Chinese challenge these days, compared to the one posed by Japan, is that such economic strength is ever more combined with military and geostrategic ambitions to become the leading country in the region and (more implicitly than explicitly) in the world. The challenge China provides today is quantitatively only comparable to that of the USA when challenging Europe in the aftermath of WW2. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union also competed with the USA chiefly in the ideological, military and space technology fields, but was never a serious global economic or commercial contender24. The challenge posed by China is unlike the American, red scare and Japanese challenge. China’s size is unrivalled by Russia or Japan. The Chinese shock has affected those who were already struggling to keep their jobs for other reasons while in Japan’s case US industry was better prepared (the context factor). It is also unlike them because China’s growth is extremely important for the global economy, whereas the relative consequences for the world brought by all other challengers would be significantly weaker. The challenge of China also has a geopolitical dimension in that it is becoming a military force and, in contrast to Japan, it is not an ally. China is the only military and economic rival of the USA and is hence creating a fundamental shift in the global distribution of power and influence (Geeraerts, 2013: 6). Based on detailed historical analysis, Subramanian notes that China’s dominance is more imminent than usually believed, will be more broadly based (covering wealth, trade, external finance, and currency), and could be as large in magnitude in the next 20 years as that of the UK in the halcyon days of the Empire or of the USA in the aftermath of World War II (2011: 4). Yet, the ‘China challenge’ has some similarities with the red one. They both used to have not only economic but also ideological roots, although the Soviet Union wanted to export socialism and China is expanding more through its economic and less through its ideological power. The second group refers to culturally-based, ideological fears, the threat of those who are exotic, because we do not know or understand them and they are ideologically different. We therefore feel threatened (USSR/Russia and China). In 1993, P. Kennedy stated that “Protectionism, anti-immigrant policies, blocking new technologies, and finding new enemies to replace Cold War foes are common reactions at a time of jolts and jars and smashes in the social life of humanity”, a view that can be applied to the current situation. Fear of this group can also be explained theoretically by the hegemonic stability and power transition theory, and eurocentrism. The third group of differences is political/ideological. While the USA, Japan and Europe share Western democratic values, China is an authoritarian socialist state, just like the Soviet Union was when it challenged the USA. However, China does not export its ideology as much as the Soviet Union did, but is first and foremost pursuing its global economic interests. By doing so, it can also indirectly pursue its ideology by spreading its soft power25 and ‘sharp power’26; for instance, by making the beneficiary states in the BRI financially dependent when they are unable to repay the large loans received for infrastructural projects within this framework (debt trap diplomacy)27. The fourth distinct factor is the changed circumstances in the world after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War and, up until recently, the strengthening of multilateralism, galloping globalisation (and de-globalisation of late), growing interdependencies and digitalisation. This is a special kind oligopolistic multilateralism, a blend of cooperation and competition between the major players that today are highly interconnected within a network of global cooperation. This power transition is occurring in a different environment, suggesting that a new cold war scenario is not very likely. Apart from the differences in all of the mentioned challenges, there are some similarities. Basically, all of the said fears: a. were based on quantitative/size factors, the rapid growth of the economies, their political and military power challenging the current system and the world hegemony, b. proved to be overblown, too dramatic, provoking paranoid panic overreactions. But nothing gets eaten as hot as it gets cooked, c. were based on ideological cultural roots, including racial, even racist prejudices28, on ethnocentrism, generating suspicions leading to eroded trust, d. were often misused for internal political battles (McCarthyism in the USA or today’s populism) and draw attention to the need to make changes in the global system’s structure and functioning and to adapt to such tectonic movements in advance, not after the event, to the transition of power underway in the global system. These fears have also caused a rethinking of certain theoretical postulates about international trade/ relations and development theories generally. This is the positive role of such fears. China is clearly the biggest challenge in the modern world. Yet, fears of a yellow peril are not new, although the forms and contexts are different, confirming Hegel when he said that history repeats itself the first time as a tragedy29 and the second time as a farce30 (Marx’s addition). These phenomena started with a red scare, the fear of the rise of Bolshevism and later the Soviet Union (now Russia) after World War II and European fears of the USA becoming dominant in the period of its post WW2 reconstruction and later the fear of Japan’s spectacular technological rise. The article has described the substantial differences and similarities that exist among the challengers due to their size, political systems, ideological basis, military strength and geopolitical ambitions, and the context. The explanatory power of the different theories varies according to individual challengers; somewhere along the line, the greatest weight was given to the realist school and power transition theory based on economic/quantitative factors as a basis for their power (Japan, USA, China), or ideological/ military factors (in the case of the Soviet Union/Russia), while elsewhere they are again more ethnocentric (Japan, China). This makes a multidisciplinary approach essential because a single discipline is unable to explain such tectonic changes and ensuing reactions. All of the mentioned fears were significantly overblown by linearly extrapolating tendencies into the future, without taking account of the historical context or other factors that hampered such linear forecasts. They were conceptualised within a ‘zero-sum’ game where the rise of one power leads to the decline of another, causing inevitable conflict with the leading one and amounting to a challenge and threat to the traditional Western-led international order. Kupchan also seems right when claiming, »that the ability of great powers to impose their preferences will only decline further in the future.… The twenty-first century will not be America’s, China’s, Asia’s, or anyone else’s. It will belong to no one«. The USA will no longer be the hegemon it once was. The transformed international system should, using Rodrik words, leave greater “policy space” for national policies and sovereignty. If the great powers act wisely, neither Pax China nor Chimerica or G2 will emerge, but a multilaterally governed world in the interest of all, not just a few. This is viable if China follows, as proposed by Colonel Liu Mingfu, the example of the USA after the experience of the UK which quietly left the lead role to the USA after WW2, and not the Soviet Union example which directly clashed with the USA during the Cold War. He advocates a tolerant, long-term strategy, a century marathon31 (see Miller, 2018). In this manner, war can be side-stepped and a new model of great-power relations developed, avoiding confrontation with the USA. It seems the Beijing Consensus is unlikely to substitute the Washington Consensus in the foreseeable future. However, it holds the potential to influence countries’ development strategies. The near future will not be the same as the last century with one country leading. There could be power sharing between China, the USA, Europe/EU32 and Russia (perhaps also India) within the spirit of a ‘collaborative autonomy’ logic. Europe is not militarily strong enough but has an advantage in terms of its soft power. According to B. Emmott (2006), while China is likely to emerge as the most powerful player, it will not be sufficiently powerful to dominate but strong enough to be significant shaper of the world order. He compares China with Britain in the early 19th century when despite being more powerful it was unable to dominate. It remains unclear whether China wants superpower status. It seems that China is aware of the danger of a strategic overstretch (paraphrasing Kennedy, 1987), as an imbalance between its strategic commitments and its economic base, although it is not immune from triumphalism after abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s low-profile approach of making China great again.

#### Yellow Peril is an existential threat – American policymaking drives pathological understandings of Asianness that threatens the very health of US Empire – this produces an apocalyptic form of securitization where contact itself becomes the legitimation of exclusion

Man 18. Jessica Man, Master of Arts degree in Asian American Studies, “The Perfect Type of Industry”: 2012 and Apocalyptic Visions of the Asian Century, *UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations*, Published 2018-01-01

“Eschaton” (from the Greek éskhaton, “the last”) refers specifically to the events of the end which bring about the future state that apocalypse reveals; the apocalypse is the method through which John delivers his description of the eschaton. An eschatology orders and gives meaning to those events. Whereas an apocalypse is an interpretive system that imputatively reframes an historical narrative, an eschatology selects the events that represent the culmination of that narrative, describing their fruition in teleological terms. John’s apocalypse is an eschatological device. In this way, the Exclusion Act, the Asiatic Barred Zone Act, and other turn-of-the century immigration acts can be understood to constitute a state or state-sanctioned eschatology. Protective and nationalist legislation is always instated to narrow down the possible futures of empire and empire’s end. If American triumphalism is a belief in the inevitable dominance of U.S. government, culture, and ways of life over those of other nations, it must be maintained and driven by an eschatological imaginary that exposes weaknesses in the imperial strategy and thinks about the ways through which the empire could be destroyed. London’s “Unparalleled Invasion” provides an apocalypse that exposes the eschatological nature of the Exclusion Act and how it anticipated the fundamental threat Chinese laborers posed to the American nationstate. The Exclusion Act and all other anti-Asian immigration laws function on, and are justified through, an imagined future predicated on the destructive power of Yellow Peril, validating a specific vision of eschaton and apocalyptically reframing the nature of Asian immigration. Apocalypse necessarily deals with periodicity. Christian theology recognizes several “marks” in its historical record: pre- and post-lapsarian time, ante- and post-diluvian time, pre and post-messianic time, pre- and post-apocalyptic time, and so forth. It also recognizes the nebulous and intractable nature of time – Giorgio Agamben notes in Infancy and History that Christianity “resolutely separates time from the natural movement of the stars to make it an essentially human, interior phenomenon” (95). The Second Epistle of Peter corroborates this observation, famously stating that “with the Lord one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day” (3:8, ESV). Eschatology therefore must be understood to extrapolate from a specific system of periodizing or marking history, but purposefully leave the actual span of the period it envelops unclear in order to avoid foreclosing itself at a certain date. In a state sanctioned eschatology, the effect is to suspend, extend, and frame the period of imperial life so that the end state of totalized destruction hangs ominously over the present moment, continually presenting a justification for exclusion and border maintenance as nationalist projects of conservation. A state-sanctioned eschatology can be expressed both through law and through cultural production, as Jack London, Robert Heinlein, and Philip F. Nowlan have aptly demonstrated. Alongside London’s “Unparalleled Invasion,” Heinlein’s The War in the Air and Nowlan’s Armageddon 2149 AD present speculative narratives that describe a Sino-American war and an American landscape under Chinese rule. Aris Mousoutzanis makes a critical intervention here in Fin-de-Siècle Fictions, 1890s/1990s by identifying apocalypse as “a form of colonization that is enacted at the interstices of technoscientific and biopolitical discourses, a motif whose early traces may be identified… as ‘reverse colonization’ narratives” (154-155). All three of these texts anticipate Chinese ascendancy and hypothesize about methods of American resistance to invasion, a tradition that has evolved alongside American anxieties about China. Now, in a global economy where China has become not only a source of stigmatized and abjected labor but also a formidable creditor of the United States,American fears have left traditional military invasions behind in favor of anticipating a networked apocalypse, where annihilation can be transmitted through bank transfers, airports, computers, and other points of international contact, including, as always, state borders. During the period of 2007-2009 known as The Great Recession, these anxieties were made explicit in the attribution of global economic recession to Chinese insistence on keeping the value of the renminbi stable instead of allowing it to depreciate alongside the American dollar (Kamrany, 2011). By the end of 2010, China owned about $900 billion of the U.S. debt (“Datablog,” 2011), a number which has appreciated beyond $1 trillion in 2018, rousing concerns that China would simply “buy” America and maintain a fiscal stranglehold with unspoken but surely destructive cultural and political consequences. Military conquest is no longer the primary mediator of relations between East Asia and the United States, although this by no means indicates a demilitarization of the area. The creditor-debtor relationship has subsumed the master-coolie relationship, where the status of “creditor” legitimizes a national ownership and therefore control over the labor force, controlling outward migration for its own nationalist projects. The partial upending of the master-coolie relationship, adding the creditor Chinese to the image of the coolie Chinese, and the creation of a global economic system of financial capital, has largely transferred anxieties about Chinese migrant laborers onto the entanglement of Chinese bankers and investors with the American economy and thus the American future, a disorderly relationship that comes much closer to realizing the threat of the Yellow Peril than anything early 20th century writers imagined. State-sanctioned eschatology has also changed since the days of London and Heinlein to reflect globalization and pathological understandings of how the world has been networked and flattened. Before the Great Recession, there was SARS, a disease that originated in southern China but was transmitted through air travel to 37 countries worldwide, including the United States. The worst of the SARS outbreak lasted for five months and was declared the first pandemic to occur in the 21st century (LeDuc and Barry, 2004), confirming fears about increased globalization and the pathological consequences of movement for networked nations that was once the sole claim of immigration. As early as the 1880s and 1890s, American apocalypticism regarding Asia had begun to incorporate ideas about disease, pathogenesis, contagion, and power quite naturally into its ideas about borders and the body politic. Mousoutzanis points out quite clearly that eugenics, disease, entropy, and imperial time were all closely linked at the turn of the 20th century; the second half of the 19th century saw the rise of the germ theory of disease, the laws of thermodynamics and the theory of the heat death of the universe, and eugenics (71-90). Disease and deformity were treated in literature and in popular discourse as entropic indicators of moral and physical decline that contradicted the triumphalist timeline of Christian empire. Entropy itself was extremely upsetting to eternist concepts of time and human survivability, putting an apocalyptic timer on the existence of the entire universe. Eugenics became popular at the time as a way to manage these indicators of declining society – disease, disability, mental illness, and race – and fight entropy, denying the possibility of the death of the universe and reasserting sociopolitical, cultural, and spiritual hierarchies of ability, race, and gender through legislation, medicinal practice, and border control. The idea of border control as preventative medicine already admits to the porous nature of policed boundaries, which McKeown discusses in great depth in his study of the enforcement of the Exclusion Act. Invasion is a type of pathology that completely obliterates borders through phagocytosis, dissolving any identity based on geographical or organ-based (i.e., state) markers. However, in fiction, this sort of dissolution can actually be a source of positive anticipation, because it aesthetically effaces the settler-colonial country and provides a chance to distill its colonial ethos. Paul Williams observes that “the post-apocalyptic world can be an arena for the replaying of the colonial encounter, frightening in its unintelligibility but alluring in its virgin promise… [it] was the most plausible arena in which imperial adventurism could be restaged” (304-305). A state-sanctioned eschatology can therefore also be understood as a contingency plan for the end and the time beyond the end, and not only as a warning system or a means of avoidance. It is also an understanding that the end of empire is not synonymous with the end of its people, and crucially provides a way to propagate its intrinsic power structures and hegemonic values in hopes that it will one day be reestablished in a different form. Postapocalyptic work that does not deconstruct the interlocking forces of patriarchy, criminality, and racialization must envision the nation and the empire as ideology. One of the best examples of this is from the final scene of Werner Herzog’s Aguirre, the Wrath of God, where the titular character stands on the remains of his ruined colonial expedition and declares: “We will produce history as others produce plays… I, the wrath of God, will marry my own daughter, and with her found the purest dynasty the world has ever seen.” Although the particular material structures of empire and means of asserting imperial ambition may crumble with time, a persistent desire for its renewal and recreation will remain – the superstructure will persevere – if the survivors of the eschaton do not enact a radical shift in the nostalgia and desires they carry through the end times.

#### The debate community avoids discussing Anti-Asian racism like the plague…

#### Asian debaters are expected to assume a restrained and calm ethos in round because their emotions are pathologized. When docility is expected, deviant behavior gets marked as too aggressive or unprofessional.

#### China has been a major part of each college resolution for the past three years, but people still can’t pronounce President Xi. Those are the same people who are the first to dock speaker points from Asian debaters for vocal inflections, tonal shifts, and accents that dance past white ears. Furthermore, every core neg argument the past four years outlined in topic papers have included iterations of Chinese deterrence that demonstrate a consistent and desired effort to make Sinophobia a stable and predictable research item.

#### As a communicative activity, debate must be held accountable for implicit, and asymmetric rhetorical protocols that maintain orientalist logics that predetermine what conversations are noted as valuable.

#### Historic use of antitrust was signaled as the “cure-all” for an increasing racialized fear of communism in Asia and the Middle East. From Hayek’s preaching of the “competition ideal” to the amendment of the Clayton Act,[[1]](#footnote-1) antitrust was repurposed for combatting the growing Red and Yellow Scare. Even now, Biden preaches

Biden 21 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/09/remarks-by-president-biden-at-signing-of-an-executive-order-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/

Let me close with this: Competition works. We know it works. We’ve seen it works when it exists. Fair competition is was what made America the wealthiest, most innovative nation in history. That’s why people come here to invent things and start new businesses. In the competition against China and other nations of the 21st century, let’s show that American democracy and the American people can truly outcompete anyone. Because I know that just given half a chance, the American people will never, ever, ever let their country down. Imagine if we give everyone a full and fair chance. That’s what this is all about. That’s what I’m about to do.

#### Politics isn’t sanitary and spills down – thus, vote neg to reject the monopoly of Sinophobia

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The 2020 COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan triggered a wave of discrimination, abuse and violence towards ESEA (East and Southeast Asian) communities in the West, with thousands of hate crimes being reported a week: from old ladies in New York being set on fire, to a Singaporean man being viciously assaulted in broad daylight on Oxford Street. Popular Asian-American media outlet NextShark has practically become a rolling newsreel for attacks like this, and there is no doubt that our communities are currently violently under attack. This has only been exacerbated by former US President Donald Trump's continued insistence on referring to COVID-19 as 'The Chinese Virus', or even 'Kung-Flu', emboldening racists across the world to enact public hatred towards people of ESEA descent. This is, of course, nothing new. Racism against ESEAs has long been considered a joke or non-existent, which has led to the widespread normalization of racism towards our communities. From personal experience, growing up I was casually called a chink, subject to jokes about penis size, eating dogs, being a Communist (in the case of the more geopolitically aware white kids), being good at maths, not being good at maths... you know, the usual. I'm sure most ESEAs who grew up in the UK or US can relate to these experiences. However, this insidious level of normalized racism is precisely why racists have felt emboldened enough to attack us in broad daylight: they know they will face little in the way of repercussions, since ESEA communities have historically been considered meek, subservient and compliant, a stereotype we often live up to, leading to a lack of activism and advocacy within our own communities, let alone society at large. Since COVID, ESEA communities across the diaspora have begun speaking up en masse, and progress has been made. In the UK, BESEA individuals like Viv Yau, Daniel York Loh and MP Sarah Owen, as well as organisations like besea.n (who I believe coined the term 'ESEA', a term I hope goes down in history as the UK's first major contribution to global Asian diaspora discourse) and End The Virus of Racism, have made enormous strides in combating racism against our community, with the very first parliamentary debate on systemic anti-ESEA racism, discussing news articles relating to COVID-19 disproportionately featuring people of ESEA descent, being held thanks to their efforts. However, there is one peculiar blind spot in anti-ESEA racism discourse, especially given the COVID-related nature of the racism currently facing our community: the glaring avoidance of the word Sinophobia. Sinophobia, or Anti-Chinese sentiment, is defined as hatred or fear against China, its people, its diaspora, and culture. The fact that I even have to define this word is symptomatic of why it's become such an insidious problem in the first place. Sinophobia is everywhere. It is undeniable that the actions of the CCP have earned it a few friends on the global stage, and people are understandably worried about its encroaching authoritarianism and apparent lack of concern for human rights. It is also undeniable that the CCP and China are demonised by Western media to an absurd degree, with editorials, news articles, videos and more, fixating on almost every single thing China does, being churned out by the hour. To use just one example - British puppet show Spitting Image recently made an excruciatingly cringe-worthy sketch parodying Chinese premier Xi Jinping. The sketch features Xi performing an asinine hip-hop parody called 'the Jinping shuffle' on his TikTok account, lampooning mainstream discourse over TikTok datamining, which I presume the writers felt was the absolute height of cutting-edge social commentary. To call this shitty little ditty ‘satire’ would be an overstatement; not only does it manage to be as painfully, offensively unfunny as the majority of Spitting Image non sequitur-based 'humour', but its depiction of Xi - complete with a mock Chinese accent and a pangolin puppet running around - is troublingly racist. Of course, the show's target audience clearly doesn’t feel this way. The comment section is almost entirely populated with people calling them brave for daring to make fun of the Chinese premier: 'Forget satirising Trump or Biden - THIS takes balls.' 'Well, you can't say Spitting Image doesn't have any balls. It was nice knowing you guys.' One person in the comments even went as far as to say this video made them feel 'proud to be [British]'. Ironic, given that it made me want to revoke my citizenship. 2 - uo8lQbR.png Either way, the comments on that video are telling. It takes an impressive amount of mass cognitive dissonance, social engineering, propaganda and media brainwashing to convince millions of people across the West that you cannot say or do anything that criticises the Chinese government... by constantly pumping out media that criticises the Chinese government. In the grand scheme of things, something tells me that between governing a nation of 1.4 billion people and navigating increasingly fraught international relations, the CCP may have bigger fish to fry than an obscure British puppet show with about as much satirical edge as Balamory. Whether or not the Chinese government deserves this criticism is another question entirely, but I cannot think of another nation in recent history that receives such aggressively frequent, biased and one-sided coverage as China. Many will respond to the above with 'I don't hate the Chinese people, just the government!', a platitude containing about as much self-awareness as classics like 'I'm not racist, I have Black friends', or perhaps more fittingly, 'I'm not racist, I have an Asian wife!' When anti-China reporting and discourse is mired in racist language deliberately manufactured to conjure up Orientalist Yellow Peril tropes ('How sickening that the dragon is roaring back' in the Daily Mail and 'China is the real sick man of Asia' in the Wall Street Journal, to name just two examples), or conflated with nebulous reports of 'Chinese netizens' (i.e. a few cherry-picked comments on Weibo) voicing reactionary beliefs, it becomes far more difficult to believe that the media is just concerned with criticising China's government. This isn't helped by the fact that the majority of English-language information about China doesn't even come from Chinese people. White men hold a terrifying monopoly over both mainstream English-language China journalism and academic discourse (just look at who wrote the last two articles I linked) with prominent, influential figures like Foreign Policy Deputy Editor James Palmer free to peddle thinly veiled xenophobia and open disdain for China and its culture under the guise of academic language and cultural expertise. When mediocre white men visit China for a month or two and are subsequently granted the clout and legitimacy to publish books that look like this and read like this, it becomes clear that there might just be a teensy-weensy bit of a racism problem when it comes to English-language China discourse. It becomes particularly ugly on the rare occasion when public figures are called out for Sinophobia, as these 'China Watchers' bend over backwards to defend each other. Recently, US Senator Marsha Blackburn tweeted that 'China has a 5,000 year history of cheating and stealing. Some things will never change...' in a tweet that anyone would consider horrifying, especially coming from a well-known politician. China Daily commentator Chen Weihua shot back, simply calling her a 'bitch', later clarifying his position that she is, in fact, a 'lifetime bitch', which drew the predictably hand-wringing ire of white liberals everywhere, far more concerned with Chen's usage of profanity than Blackburn insulting the culture, history and diaspora of billions across the world. 7+-+YwhxtIu.jpg Like clockwork, figures such as self-professed 'China Historian' James Millward came out of the woodwork to defend her, making the wildly delusional claim that rather than just being racist, Blackburn's tweet was in fact 'adopting the 5000 years of history trope to criticize the PRC', with Millward proceeding to snidely weaponize stereotypes about Chinese people with his remark that 'Chen Weihua's Twitter Team is not English-savvy enough to know what is too much even on Twitter'. Millward is undeniably giving Blackburn too much credit, and this tweet is enough of a reach that I wonder whether Millward would be better suited as a yoga instructor, but this exchange is nonetheless highly representative of how China is talked about in the English language. When the Anglophone narrative around China is almost entirely dominated by a self-congratulatory circle-jerk of white men who are given free rein to say almost anything they want with impunity, and only held accountable for their brazen prejudice by people with comparatively tiny platforms (like me!! hi x), it's little wonder that open Sinophobia has become such a virulent issue. 6 - cvhJZ99.png The woke consensus on China hasn't been established yet, which means that most white liberal 'progressives' will fall back into old habits when talking about China, those habits of course being Orientalism, xenophobia and racism. The fact that we have seen such a huge rise in hate crimes towards ESEA people as a result of COVID is only proof that the media's extensive Sinophobia campaign is working - after all, if people really only 'hate the Chinese government, not the people', this would not be happening at all. When discussing the recent hate crimes, Minister for Safeguarding Victoria Atkins literally used the exact words 'racist abuse on the basis of perceived Chinese ethnicity'. Japanese musician Tadataka Unno was recently attacked by a gang of youths in New York who thought he was Chinese. Trump has been widely criticised for his repeated usage of the phrase 'China Virus' feeding into anti-Asian racism. Chinese people have been referred to as 'evil bastards' by the very people running our country in House of Commons debates. Do I need to go on? In his excellent article 'The Politics of Being Chinese' for besea.n, Vy-liam Ng has become one of the few BESEA writers to directly engage with Sinophobia itself, listing many examples of how China and Chinese identity are viewed as 2020's biggest 'political bogeyman'. He lists many of the ways China has been demonised by the media in just this year alone, and it's clear that this coverage encompasses far more than just the CCP's actions - these are direct, brazen attacks on Chinese people being pumped out by the institutions most people rely on as sources of information. As he eloquently puts it, 'there’s no pause button as the world creates these narratives with or without us'. At this point it isn't just people of Chinese descent who are being affected: the constant, violent and indiscriminate propagandisation of Chinese identity affects East and Southeast Asians everywhere. Sinophobia is rampant, systemic, insidious, constant and all-encompassing, and it is abundantly clear that the recent wave of Coronaracism towards East and Southeast Asian communities stems largely from Sinophobia - so why do we keep skirting around using the word? Why are we so afraid of calling a spade a spade? Where does this habitual aversion stem from?

## 2

#### CP Text: Istadus unidos ukampirus jan masi pashna.

#### J’ani amuyu

Belcourt 17 (Billy-Ray Belcourt is from Driftpile Cree First Nation. He is a PhD student in the Department of English and Film Studies at the University of Alberta. “The Optics of the Language: How Joi T. Arcand Looks with Words.” 8-29-17. <https://canadianart.ca/features/optics-language-joi-t-arcand-looks-words/> //shree)

What did Bushby see? In his formulation, “one” brings into focus a sinister optic, where “optic” is the lens or filter by which one looks and from this looking ropes what is seen into an encounter humming with all sorts of potential. Bushby’s is an optic that mediates the interpellative call “one” seeks to enact—it is a part of the grammar of settler horror. “One” is thus a modality by which we, the ante-Canada, those of us who bear that which is prior to and beneath Canada, are racialized and roped into a representational field where all things, like trailer hitches, can be put to violent use. We cannot survive in the visual register of “one.” Words are worldly; not just in the sense that they proliferate and float up into the sky and become cloud-like. Words world too. Words like “one” incubate death-worlds (see Achille Mbembe’s 2003 essay “Necropolitics”) inside which those of us who look like Kentner are made to inhabit modes of enfleshment that fix the stares of the grim reapers of the present. On the other hand, some of us recruit words in the name of something like freedom. We might call this duality the double-bind of enunciation. How do we refuse a savage call to being with a more spacious one? Joi T. Arcand is a photo-based artist and industrial sculptor from Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, and she knows that words, that letter forms, shapes and glyphs, “change the visual landscape,” that they are how we go about practicing new ways of looking. Words are emotional architectures, and Arcand calls hers “Future Earth.” In her 2015 book The Argonauts, Maggie Nelson tends to a debate about whether words do or do not potentiate. She takes up a claim of a partner’s that words do nothing but nominalize, and what is left unnamed is subject to a host of horrors. Nelson, however, holds out more hope for words; she contends that they are “good enough,” that how one speaks makes all of the difference and that words can, following Deleuze, incite “the outline of a becoming.” Bushby’s angered vocalization of a genre of non-being—where “one” is the refusal of a name and the humanity that comes with it—is evidence of the terrible mechanics of language. But, it is in opposition to this linguistic state of killability, this metaphysics and rhetoric of coloniality, that Arcand articulates a grammar of subjectivity vis-à-vis the time and space of a native future. Here on Future Earth is a series of photographs that Arcand produced in 2010. In a phone interview, Arcand explained to me that this is where her photo-based practice and her interest in textuality synched. Arcand wants us to think about these photographs as documents of “an alternative present,” of a future that is within arm’s reach. For this series, Arcand manipulated signs and replaced their slogans and names with Cree syllabics. By doing this, Arcand images something of a present beside itself and therefore loops us into a new mode of perception, one that enables us to attune to the rogue possibilities bubbling up in the thick ordinariness of everyday life. Arcand wanted to see things “where they weren’t.” Hers is not a utopian elsewhere we need to map out via an ethos of discovery. Rather, Arcand straddles the threshold of radical hope. She asks us to orient ourselves to the world as if we were out to document or to think back on a future past. That is, Arcand rendered these photographs with a pink hue and a thick, round border, tapping into what she calls “the signifiers of nostalgia.” Importantly, these signifiers are inextricably bound to the charisma of words, to the emotional life of the syllabics. The syllabics are what enunciate; they potentiate a performance of world-making that does not belong to the mise-en-scene of settlement. It is this mise-en-scene of settlement that Arcand conjures to then obliterate, which is to say that her photographs evince a prairie world that is crowded with meaning, meaning that belongs differently to the logic of terra nullius (that a place exists without history or politics prior to European settlement) and to myths of Indian savagery and degeneracy. It is against this system of signs that Arcand opens the prairies up to radical resignification. It is where we build a future atop the decayed remains of coloniality. Perhaps Here on Future Earth visually captures the tempos of “Indian time,” which is always a scene of errant temporality. Indian time is less about the absence of rhythm and more about an inability to fix or to analytically hold up the rhythmic as a mode of feral movement itself. Words like “one” are spun such that they stomp us into the rut of social death. But: Indian time evinces an otherwise kinetics. In Here on Future Earth, this kinetics is energized by the textual, by the stories that they tell, and their visual culture. The modified signs exploit our ability to look; that we see them and conceptualize them as out of place or untimely is how we transport ourselves to a different time, to a place governed by Indian time. The syllabics themselves map a visual field. This is what Arcand calls “the optics of the language.” It is around these words that sociality orbits. This thematic persists in Arcand’s latest project, a set of large neon signs that light up Cree words like keyam. For Arcand, all of her engagements with the Cree language are partly elegiac. She is mourning language loss, but puts this negative affect to rebellious use to signify a world-to-come. Like the syllabics in Here on Future Earth, the bright signs prop up affective structures for a time and place where our relations to Cree are not always-already bound up in performances of grief. In one sign, Arcand translates the English phrase “I don’t have the words” into Cree. “I don’t have the words” is a paradoxical speech act; it uses words to announce their absence. These signs are installed in gallery spaces where Arcand’s work is commissioned; one was recently installed at the second gesture of the Wood Land School at the SBC Gallery of Contemporary Art in Montreal, another outside the Walter Phillips Gallery in Banff. These signs interrupt the visual terrain of the gallery, as if welcoming onlookers to a new world, to a new geographic form. The signs something like kinship around a common wordlessness in the service of a new world-making praxis. These photographs and signs, then, are all relics of a future past. They emerge from something of an anthropological interest in a future-in-the-present, in the affects of Indian time. Arcand thus writes the world wrong so that she can write it anew.

## Case

### Solvency

#### First question: Who/What killed Vincent Chin?

Warikoo 17 (Niraj Warikoo, Reporter for the Detroit Free Press, “Vincent Chin murder 35 years later: History repeating itself?,” June 23, 2017, <https://www.freep.com/story/news/2017/06/24/murder-vincent-chin-35-years-ago-remembered-asian-americans/420354001/>)

Thirty-five years ago this week, Gary Koivu visited a Detroit hospital to see his friend Vincent Chin, his head swathed in bandages after being slugged in Highland Park by a man with a baseball bat. "It was very upsetting," recalled Koivu, 61, of Harrison Township, who was 26 at the time of the incident. "I had been friends with him for 20 years. I asked the nurse, How is he doing? What are his chances? She said, he has no chance, she said his brain was dead." A couple of days later, Chin died, 35 years ago Thursday. The tragic death — and subsequent lenient punishment (probation and a $3,000 fine) — outraged Asian Americans in Detroit. They organized, forming new coalitions and the civil rights group American Citizens for Justice, sparking an Asian-American civil rights movement that continues today. On Saturday, a forum will be held at a Chinese-American center in Madison Heights to remember Vincent Chin with a documentary screening, panel discussion with Koivu and the director of Michigan's Civil Rights Dept. and a visit to Chin's grave site in Detroit. Of Chinese descent, Chin was an adopted son of immigrants from China in metro Detroit. The case of Vincent Chin reverberates today amid renewed concern about hate crimes and anti-immigrant sentiment, say Asian-American attorneys in metro Detroit. They point to the shooting death in Kansas in February of an Indian-American man, Srinivas Kuchibhotla, by a suspect who yelled, "Get out of my country" and asked if he was a legal immigrant before shooting him and another Indian American. Federal prosecutors have filed hate crime charges in the case. In Michigan, there was an upswing in hate crimes against minorities after the November election, according to state officials. And Michigan had the highest number of hate crimes post-election in the Midwest, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center. "History seems to be repeating itself," said James Shimoura, a Sylvan Lake attorney of Japanese descent who was active in organizing after the Chin case in the 1980s. "Some always try to find scapegoats for social and economic ills. The target changes, but same issue." The June 1982 incident started after an attacker yelled at Chin: "It's because of you little (expletives) that we're out of work!" and anti-Asian racial slurs denigrating Chinese and Japanese people. In 1982, metro Detroit was going through a recession with many autoworkers out of work as anti-Asian racism, in particular against Japan, began to rise. Auto executives, union leaders and politicians in Michigan made anti-Japanese remarks, creating a climate that made many Asian Americans uneasy. Anyone who looked Japanese in the early 1980s or any Asian American, we all felt like moving targets," said author Helen Zia, who was an unemployed autoworker of Chinese descent living in Detroit at the time of the Vincent Chin killing. "People who drove cars of Japanese models were shot at on the freeway. ... That's the climate I remember 35 years ago." Shimoura said "it was a powder keg" of racial animosity that exploded at a bar Chin was at in Highland Park with friends to celebrate before his upcoming wedding. After a scuffle inside the bar, Ronald Ebens, who worked in the auto industry, and his stepson, Michael Nitz, later chased down Chin, smashing his head with a bat.

#### Second Question: Who/What will they kill next?

Espiritu 93 (Yen Le, Espiritu, Distinguished Professor of Ethnic Studies at UC San Diego, “Asian American Panethnicity,” 1993, Temple University Press) \*inserted quotations marked by brackets

Factors Contributing to Anti-Asian Activities Social scientists continue to debate the etiology of intergroup conflicts. Most of the dialogue has been structured around a confrontation between class-based and race-based theorists. For class-based theorists, economic competition plays the central role in structuring social relations (Bonacich 1972; Cummings 1980). In contrast, race-based theorists insist that unfavorable attitudes toward a racial group cause intergroup conflicts (Allport 1958; Myrdal 1962). As III many cases of racial conflicts, factors that contribute to antiAsian activities include class as well as ideational elements. Economic Competition Resource competition theory posits that self-interest explains public animosity toward immigrants. Especially during economic downturns, the [“]native-born[“] blame immigrants for the nation's problems and regard them as unwanted competitors (Bonacich 1972; Light 1983: ch. 13). Historically, Asians in the United States have borne most of the blame for economic woes (Saxton 1971; Kitano 1980; K. Wong 1985). Recent anti-Asian activities coincided with the deteriorating economic conditions that began after 1975. In a context of high unemployment, climbing inflation, and skyrocketing interest rates, competition between Asians and non-Asians often escalated into intergroup conflicts (California, Governor's Task Force on Civil Rights 1982; Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations 1984; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1986). A 1980 poll conducted in nine cities indicated that 47 percent of the respondents believed that "Indochinese refugees take jobs away from others in my area" I Starr and Roberts 1982). According to a 1989 Los Angeles Times poll, a quarter of the respondents believed that Asian Americans were gaining too much economic power; no other group was similarly described by more than 7 percent IRoderick 1989Q). The mushrooming of Asian businesses across the country has also evoked anti-Asian sentiment, often expressed in efforts to ban Asian-language business signs (Fong 1987; Siao 1989Q). The rapid influx of Asian immigrants to the United States since 1965 further exacerbated the tension between Asians and non-Asians IDesbarats 1985: 522-523). In particular, the growing presence of Korean businesses in black neighborhoods in Baltimore, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., New York City, and Los Angeles has fueled black anger, at times leading to racial violence II. Kim 1981; Light and Bonacich 1988: ch. 12; Cheng and Espiritu 1989). In addition to actual or alleged domestic economic competition, Asian Americans are resented for the United States' international trade imbalances. A period of economic recession in the United States coincided with a rise of Pacific Rim economies, not only that of Japan but also those of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Unable to keep pace with Asian competition, traditional industries such as steel and automobiles experienced severe downturns. American businesses and labor unions, as well as elected officials, blamed the ills of American industry on business competition with Asian countries ISmollar 1983; US. Commission on Civil Rights 1986: 36-37). A prime example is automobile manufacturing: many Americans attributed the unemployment among American automobile workers to the large Japanese share of automobiles sold in the United States IUS. Commission on Civil Rights 1986: 36). A 1982 national poll indicated that 44 percent of the public blamed US. economic problems "almost completely" or "very much'! on Japanese business competition 1M. Woo 1983). Anti-Japanese sentiment appeared on bumper stickers that read "Toyota-Datsun-Honda-and Pearl Harbor" and "Unemployment Made in Japan" IUS. Commission on Civil Rights 1986: 40). Unfortunately, anger against Asian nations is often transferred to Americans of Asian ancestry, who have suffered from a long history of anti-Asian attitudes and behaviors (Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations 1984: 2; R. Matsui 1984: 63). Attitudinal surveys reveal that anti-Asian sentiments are still alive and well today. In a survey of 2,000 Americans, the Roper Organization (19821 asked respondents to indicate whether each of the fifteen ethnic groups listed has "on balance . .. been a good thing or a bad thing for this couptry." No European group received lower than a 53 percent positive ratingj in contrast; no Asian group received higher than a 47 percent positive rating. Survey results also indicate that many Americans do not welcome Asian immigrants and refugees. According to a 1975 Harris poll, more than 50 percent of the American people thought Southeast Asian refugees should not be allowed to enter the United Statesj only 26 percent favored their entry. Many seemed to share Congressman Burt Talcott's conclusion that, "Damn it, we have too many Orientals" (cited in Rose 1985: 2051. Five years later, public opinion toward the refugees had not changed. A 1980 poll of American attitudes in nine cities revealed that nearly half of those surveyed believed that the Southeast Asian refugees should have settled in other Asian countries (Starr and Roberts 198 I I. This poll also found that over 77 percent of the respondents would disapprove of the marriage of a Southeast Asian refugee into their family and 65 percent would not be willing to have a refugee as a guest in their home (Roberts 1988: 811· Anti-Asian sentiment seemed to be symptomatic of the general anti-immigrant mood beginning in the late 1970s. Poll results indicated that, between 1965 and 1981, the proportion of the US. public favoring a decrease in legal immigration rose sharply (California, Governor's Task Force on Civil Rights 1982 : 521. However, opposition toward immigrants was not directed equally toward all groups. A survey of San Diego County found that 36 percent of the respondents believed Asian immigrants had a negatIve impact on the city, but only 17 percent thought Western European immigrants had a negative impact (Cornelius 1982: 161. Along the same lines, the media decry Japanese ownership of US. property but largely ignore European investment-even though Europeans own the most American real estate.2 In 1985, the British held $44 billion and the Dutch $38 billion in US. real estate. In contrast, the Japanese owned $35 billion in US. real estate in 1988. The disproportionate political and media attention to Japanese ownership suggests "that the professed concern for overseas ownership is a smokescreen for racial animosity toward Asians" (California, Attorney General's Commission 1986: 27-28).

### Cartels

#### US Antitrust isn’t a domestic attitude, it’s an international structure that coerces and condemns other nations into a continual state structural adjustment. Competition bleeds outward and mutates developing nations into a deformed image of Empire that will never be cared for.

Waked 16 (Dina I. Waked, Assistant Professor of Law at Sciences Po Law School, “Adoption of Antitrust Laws in Developing Countries: Reasons and Challenges,” 2016, Journal of Law Economics and Policy, Vol. 12.2)

The unprecedented spread of antitrust laws in the 1990s raises the question of why did developing countries adopt competition laws in the 1990s and not before? Further, why did so many of them suddenly become interested in competition law adoption? There is no simple answer, except to say that competition laws were not considered an important addition to their arsenal of laws up until the 1990s. One reason was that many countries had provisions either in their penal codes, civil codes, or commercial legislations dealing with competition law issues before formally adopting legislation that is solely concerned with competition matters.8 This made them less interested in adopting particular laws dealing with competition, seeing that they had general provisions in other legislation dealing with the same issues. Then why did so many suddenly become interested in these kind of laws in the 1990s? It is simplistic to argue, yet probably true, that many countries were entering trade agreements in the 1990s that made the adoption of competition law a prerequisite to the implementation of the trade deals.9 These treaties were either trade agreements creating free trade zones or part of structural programs that intended to open up the developing world economies and facilitated the entry of foreign entities that considered a competition law a necessity and guarantee for their work abroad, in particularly in a developing country. More generally, the 1990s are considered the era where developing world countries started to put an end to their former protectionist policies that were either inspired by communist or socialist regimes or simply by efforts to industrialize and strengthen national champions and local producers. The 1990s introduced the new era of international trade, encouraging foreign direct investment, and membership in regional trade agreements or the World Trade Organization (WTO). With the emergence of many of these structural changes, open door policies and participation in world trade relations, competition laws were suddenly prescribed as necessities to fa-cilitate much of the impending changes.10 It is important to understand the role played by the WTO and other international organizations in encouraging and often requiring new members to adopt these laws in order to understand the surge in the developing world.11 Similarly, the role played by the EU in encouraging new members and trade partners to adopt competition law is even more straightforward.12 Adopting these laws seemed to many as the missing link to assure growth and development.13 Therefore, one could argue that one of the main factors that led to the widespread adoption of competition laws across developing countries is the push exercised by supranational bodies. Another factor is the overwhelming evidence these international bodies were presenting to developing countries illustrating a positive relationship between adopting a competition law and development. Competition laws appeared to be the missing link needed to usher in prosperity and growth. The pressure by international bodies and the development hopes that adopting competition laws carried are discussed in more detail next. A. The Push by International Bodies to Adopt Competition Laws International and supranational bodies have considered competition laws essential for economic reforms. Ever since competition laws were discussed as part of the agenda of the negotiations to establish an International Trade Organization (ITO) after World War II, competition laws were considered a vital requirement for needed reforms. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) upheld the rhetoric of the ITO and included competition issues and restrictive business practices in a “best endeavor” clause.14 However, the GATT did not require the adoption of specific provisions dealing with the treatment of private restrictive business practices (RBPs).15 Therefore, the members of the WTO could freely adopt their own national competition laws so long as they did not infringe the principle of nondiscrimination.16 The General Council of the WTO created a Working Group in April 1997 on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy. This Working Group strongly called on developing countries to adopt competition rules in the face of the global merger wave underway and the structural changes taking place within the developing countries as a result of their liberalization and free trade policies.17 The WTO's focus on competition law adoption is due to the widely believed interaction between competition policies and the expansion of free trade.18 Effective free trade policies require, next to the withdrawal of trade barriers, the elimination of obstacles originating from private restraints resulting from abuse of dominance, monopolization, import and export cartels, horizontal and vertical restraints, and other issues considered to be competition law violations.19 To achieve these results, the WTO urged developing countries to adopt competition rules, often US or EC type competition policies, while encouraging for time lags in the introduction of these different aspects of competition rules to be able to efficiently implement them. One can explain the WTO’s continuous attempt to influence, encourage, and facilitate the adoption of competition legislation in developing countries by its aspirations towards harmonizing competition laws to one day usher in universal competition policies under its umbrella.20 The WTO is repeatedly encouraging agreements on core antitrust principles as a first step towards the achievement of this goal.21 When developing countries adopt rules similar to those in more developed countries, the attempt at harmonization seems more realistic and at the same time the effects of global anticompetitive conduct with relation to trade can be better tackled. If laws adopted in developing countries were fundamentally different from those in the advanced world, the ability of the developed countries to protect their interests from anti-competitive practices in developing countries would be limited. Thereby, not only would similar competition laws encourage more effective free trade, but would also give a sense of security for FDIs and MNCs working in developed countries. One can also argue that it would give the host developing country more teeth to prosecute prohibitive conduct emanating from local or foreign entities, and to challenge harmful global mergers. The WTO is not alone in encouraging competition law adoption across the developing world. Several international financial institutions consider a competition policy dimension when evaluating country risk necessary for lending purposes.22 For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Development Association (IDA) look at a country’s competition policy when assessing the situation of borrower countries before deciding to allocate the funds needed.23 A classic example is the case of Indonesia, where the country was required by the IMF to adopt a competition law in return for rescue money.24 It is worth noting that the first conditionality appeared in a World Bank industrial sector adjustment loan to Argentina in 1991.25Also, the United Nations and the OECD played a role in pushing for the adoption of competition laws across developing countries. Both institutions have adopted and promoted non-legally enforceable “codes of conduct” to prevent anticompetitive practices.26 The United Nations has also set up, under the rubric of the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United National Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA), several projects and initiatives that assist developing countries in the design and implementation of their competition policies.27 The increased interest of international and supranational bodies with regard to encouraging adoption of competition laws in the developing world originated in the wave of neoliberal reforms as part of the Washington consensus, which resulted in privatization and liberalization across developing countries. Some of the goals of these reforms were to put an end to government monopolies and governmental intervention in the economy through liberalizations and privatizations. However, the result of the wave of privatization was that government monopolies were simply replaced by private monopolies yielding the same anti-competitive effects.28 For the past two decades or more, the World Bank Group and other development organizations have encouraged developing and emerging market economies to adopt pro-competition measures such as trade and investment liberalization, privatization, and economic deregulation. These initiatives have been aimed primarily at reducing public sector policy-based barriers to entry, regulatory costs, and delays that unnecessarily constrain private sector economic activity . . . . They are, however, insufficient— they are complementary to but do not substitute for an effective competition law-policy. They do not address the private sector restrictive business practices that can significantly impede competition. Unchecked, anticompetitive practices by dominant and politically connected firms and vested interest groups can capture or significantly reduce the benefits that accrue from competition . . . . Competition does not arise or sustain itself automatically. The competitive process needs to be maintained, protected, and promoted to strengthen the development of a sound market economy. 29 Similar rhetoric was reproduced over and over, not only by these international organizations, but also by lawyers, economists, and policy makers. The result was that adopting competition rules became a priority on the agenda of economic growth in many less developed countries, who pushed forward with the help or pressure of various supranational institutions. Some countries, however, resisted the push to adopt competition laws and continued to prefer concentration to competition. They, thereby, had less of a drive to adopt competition laws based on their own initiatives. Others felt the need to adopt competition laws and to drive their markets towards the perfect competition ideal. Part of this desire was their belief in the rhetoric presented to them, but also due to the increased cross-border influences of anti-competitive practices,30 especially their import of cartel-affected goods.31 Trading partners have also requested the adoption of antitrust laws as a condition for signing free trade agreements.32 For example, the EU has been extremely active in the process of spreading its competition law to developing countries. This is to the extent where “some argue that today the EC competition law is the dominant model of competition law in the world.”33 Treaties, such as the Accession Agreements signed by Eastern European countries to join the EU34 or the Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreements signed by various non-European Mediterranean countries and the EU, oblige the signatories to adopt competition laws modeled on Article 101 (formally 81) and 102 (formally 82) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).35 One of the studies on the adoption competition laws across countries suggests that “the impetus for adopting antitrust laws appears related to the imposed guidelines of supranational bodies, in particular the requirements of the European Union.”36 One reason why the EU has been actively involved in shaping the competition laws of developing countries could be the fact that the EU is an important trading partner and, therefore, it is eager to trade with countries that have similar laws. Another reason could be its race with the US on issues relating to harmonization of competition rules, whereby its influence on the competition laws of developing countries is an attempt to diffuse its laws, which could push the balance in its favor when negotiations on harmonized rules are underway. It is also worth noting that the EU is not the sole entity to require the adoption of competition laws in its bilateral trade agreements with developing countries. Many Free Trade Agreements have endorsed similar requirements, where parties to these agreements are required to have a domestic antitrust regime in place as one of the main conditions before entering into the agreement.37 Other bilateral and regional free trade agreements have also included chapters on competition policy.38 Finally, several nongovernmental organizations have also advocated the adoption of these laws and promoted assistance to countries in their implementation phases.39B. Development Hopes Associated with Adopting Competition Laws Development hopes have been crucial in the spread of competition laws. The direct impact of adopting competition laws on prosperity, economic growth, and development is often the reason furnished by these international institutions for developing countries to adopt these laws. The heightened interest in competition law adoption “suggests competition law is widely seen as a desirable and worthwhile economic policy.”40 Competition policy has often been regarded as a building block of economic development. A paper of the WTO Working Group described that: The specific benefits that have been attributed to such policy include promoting an efficient allocation of resources, preventing/addressing excessive concentration levels and resulting structural rigidities, addressing anti-competitive practices of enterprises . . . enhancing an economy’s ability to attract foreign investment and to maximize the benefits of such investment, reinforcing the benefits of privatization and regulatory reform initiating and establishing a focal point for the advocacy of pro-competitive reforms and a competition culture.41 The United Nations has also advocated, on many instances, that competition policy is a key ingredient for growth and development of nations.42 The same position has been taken by the OECD. One of its publications based on a survey of OECD members and non-members asserts that: There are strong links between competition policy and numerous basic pillars of economic development. . . . There is persuasive evidence from all over the world confirming that rising levels of competition have been unambiguously associated with increased economic growth, productivity, investment and increased average living standards.43 These kinds of assumptions are often backed by empirical studies showing that adopting competition laws lead to higher competition intensi-ties,44 which is automatically read to mean higher growth levels. The microeconomic fields of industrial organization and endogenous growth present ample material to show how competition is positively associated with growth. For example, one study argued that competition rules help sustain two of the fundamental ingredients of “economic growth: namely competitive markets and a sound legal system.”45 Another study stressed the fact that the adoption of competition policy is “positively correlated with the intensity of competition.”46 A further empirical study using multi-country regression analysis to explore the correlation between competition and growth rates found a “strong correlation between the effectiveness of competition policy and growth.”47 This study also illustrated that the effect of competition on growth is more than that of “trade liberalisation, institutional quality, and a general favourable policy environment.”48 This, however, was found to be predominantly true for Far Eastern countries and less so for other developing countries.49 Other proponents of the relationship between adopting competition laws and development argue that competition rules are a precondition to the implementation of successful privatization, especially if the goal of privatization is not the substitution of government monopolies by private ones.50 Similarly, another study concluded that liberalization alone does not lead to development since “non-tariff barriers to trade will replace tariffs that trade liberalization removes because of the political power of rent-seeking special interest groups.”51 Some also suggest that having competition legislation will deter corruption in transition economies, where “government bodies have tremendous power to affect the competitive process when they issue licenses, permits, franchises, and subsidies.”52 When these economies adopt competition laws some of the powers of government officials might be curbed and their responsiveness to bribes in order to facilitate illicit economic privileges might be reduced. This is assuming that the enforcers of the competition laws will not themselves be susceptible to bribes to avoid antitrust enforcement. Moreover, competition policy is considered essential for developing countries as a tool to increase foreign direct investment (FDI), which is considered essential for growth.53 Adopting antitrust laws creates a more transparent framework that increases investors’ reliance on the economy and reduces transaction costs.54 These are only some of the studies testing the relationship between competition law and development. It is important to note that most of the above-mentioned studies either test the correlation between adopting competition laws and development or between a proxy called “effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy”55 and development. This is drastically different from studying the relationship between enforcing the competition laws and development. The latter should be the measure used to ascertain whether competition laws lead to development or not. Studying enforcement instead of adoption will not necessarily lead to the same conclusions. Regardless, developing countries have found the promises of development and growth associated with the adoption of competition laws too hard to ignore. International organizations and academic studies presenting the positive relationship between competition laws and development were made readily available to developing countries. The studies have shown persuasive conclusions that developing countries eagerly accepted. At the same time, these nations encountered numerous challenges, some structurally due their own positions as developing countries and some related to the discourse that competition laws lead to development and growth. Both of these challenges are discussed next. III. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN: CHALLENGES TO ANTITRUST ADOPTION This section addresses some of the recurrent challenges articulated in adopting a competition law. Some of these challenges are due to the idiosyncratic nature of developing countries, yet others are more general critiques to the merits of competition laws. A. Limited Resources Need Not Be Wasted on a Costly Competition Regime Developing countries face numerous challenges with regard to adopting and enforcing competition rules. At the outset, enacting competition legislation was not always considered a priority on their reform agendas. This is due to the high costs and low returns associated with adopting these rules compared to other reform-oriented policies, such as removing trade restrictions. One of the common arguments is that trade liberalization yields far greater prosperity than adopting laws that attack restraints of trade. The advocates of trade liberalization, as a substitute for antitrust, argue that the mere removal of trade obstacles, such as tariffs and barriers to entry, will effectively discipline domestic producers in transition economies.56 They support the notion that “[f]ree trade is, consequently, the best antitrust policy.”57 Also, the argument that “[f]ree trade stimulates wealth creation and development, and in a small country it makes antitrust concerns largely irrelevant,”58 has been made to caution against adoption competition laws. Another argument in favor of trade liberalization is that the limited public resources of transition economies would produce better outcomes if invested in initiatives improving the flow of goods. For example, improvement in infrastructure would give consumers access to an increased number of sellers.59 Similarly, it is argued that economic policy and competition law enforcement divert the scarce resources away from more important priorities on the path to reform and development. The famous quote from one of the fierce opponents to imposing competition laws on transition economies, Paul Godek, is worth noting: “[e]xporting antitrust to Eastern Europe is like giving a silk tie to a starving man. It is superfluous; a starving man has much more immediate needs. And if the tie is knotted too tightly, he will not be able to eat what little there is available to him.”60 B. Plenty of Reforms to Accommodate a Competition Enforcement Apparatus Are Needed Related to the criticism of spending scarce resources on adopting and enforcing competition laws is the claim that developing countries need also acquire, reform, or implement administrative apparatuses, effective judiciary and appeal systems, independent investigating authorities, and expertise.61 Most developing countries lack the aforementioned necessities to enforce antitrust laws. To improve the chances of effective antitrust implementation, developing countries need serious reforms in these areas. These are all costly endeavors that would deplete their resources further. In addition to these challenges, developing countries face further obstacles to competition enforcement due to the lack of data collection, which is especially necessary to define market shares. This is evident by the lack of effective “Statistics Offices” in public administrations that provide this information.62 The weakness of professional associations and consumer groups are also considered challenges that stand in the way of creating awareness and a competition culture that are essential to facilitate the smooth spread and implementation of these laws.63 Given these drawbacks in developing economies, what is ultimately feared is that the enforcement authority to be set up will not be able to apply the competition rules. It will lack the necessary funding, technical staff, and supporting environment to effectively enforce the law. It is also often argued, that in a developing country, an administrative body will often lack the necessary independence that is arguably critical for antitrust enforcement.64 C. Corruption, Government Intervention and Crony Capitalism Hamper Effective Competition Policy One of the critical challenges that face developing countries is the already high level of government interference in the economy, which is by default increased further when a competition law is adopted and enforced. The government intervention includes government-erected barriers to enter or exit the market,65 government monopolies, the various forms of subsidies granted by governments to loss-making enterprises,66 and government politicization of the administrative authorities in force of applying and enforcing the law. In most developing countries, governments play an active role in regulating and setting bureaucratic measures to be followed by firms to enter or exit the market, resulting in many instances in rigid barriers that cannot be surpassed. This in turn leads to rent-seeking behavior, cronyism, corruption, and favoritism.67 Adopting a competition law is arguably adding another layer of bureaucratic red tape that needs to be surpassed for firms to operate effectively. Similarly, this criticism amounts to the fear that competition policy will be a tool to provide disguised government control and hamper the growth of the often-fragile private sector. Developing countries also portray a unique political economy, where often government interests and those of the business elite are one and the same.68 This casts serious doubt on whether competition law enforcement will not be selectively used to create further obstacles to those players that are not part of this favored club. It may only entrench the powers of the incumbent firms and those that pay the highest rewards to the government apparatus.69 It is often argued that developing economies are enmeshed in a “Kafkaesque maze of control”70 where large family owners use their influence to limit competition and obtain finances from the government to alter the game in their favor.71 The poorly functioning capital markets in many developing countries furthers the concentrated ownership of the local elite even more. The fear is that incumbent firms use their rents to pay for such selective and biased enforcement, which can often not be matched by new entrants and small firms who want a piece of the pie.72 Incumbent firms want to maintain the status quo and resist any potential changes that might lower their influence and position in the market.73 Given this political economy “[a]ntitrust policies affected by political considerations may, however, come with a large price tag attached.”74 One of which is that “interest groups will follow their incentives and shift resources into monopolization through government protection. Lobbying the government for protection may be highly substitutable for organizing cartels.”75 In other words, producers and incumbents will now invest their rents in lobbying the government to continue their monopoly positions. Rodriguez and Williams argue that “the gain to interest groups of establishing cartels or price-fixing schemes are outweighed by simply soliciting preferential treatment from the state.”76 This implies that “antitrust may cause inefficiencies that are worse than the allocative losses that it is designed to defend against.”77 Such bureaucratic capture is assumed to make enforcers not able to serve the public interest.78 Nonetheless, arguments using interest group theory to qualify antitrust enforcement are not without their own critiques.79 Adding high levels of corruption to the mix, it is predictable that empowering the governments in developing countries with a competition law will lead to even more corruption spent to alter the game in the favor of the local elite and friends of the government at the expense of overall welfare. Such political and bureaucratic resistance is arguably among the main problems facing developing countries in terms of implementing their competition laws and creating a competition culture.8

### China

#### Chinese leadership in 5G will successfully push for surveillance regulations to improve AI development globally

Burt 19 (Chris, Chris Burt is the editor of Biometric Update. He has also written nonfiction about information technology, dramatic arts, sports culture, and fantasy basketball, as well as fiction about a doomed astronaut. He lives in Toronto. “Standards for biometric surveillance being drafted for ITU by Chinese businesses”, https://www.biometricupdate.com/201912/standards-for-biometric-surveillance-being-drafted-for-itu-by-chinese-businesses)

Technology companies based in China are working to shape United Nations’ standards for facial recognition, video monitoring, and surveillance of cities and vehicles, with ZTE, Dahua, China Telecom and others proposing standards to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), The Financial Times reports. While European and North American businesses participate heavily in the standards bodies such as the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), the ITU gives China a chance to leverage its influence in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, where ITU standards are often adopted as policy. “African states tend to go along with what is being put forward by China and the ITU as they don’t have the resources to develop standards themselves,” explains internet human rights company Global Partners Digital Head of Legal Richard Wingfield to FT. Several African nations have invested in Chinese facial recognition and related technologies, with a purchase of CCTV systems with facial biometrics from Huawei by Uganda a recent example. FT also reports that biometric data from African countries could be of particular interest to Chinese companies, who can use it to train their algorithms for improved results, particularly matching faces of people with darker skin. Members of international delegations told FT that ITU standards are increasingly written by companies, rather than governments. The standards, which typically take around two years to be drafted and adopted, are highly influential around the world, however, particularly in the developing world. “A number of Chinese companies have really started to rise and seize market share around the world in these areas [such as face recognition and visual surveillance],” says Steven Feldstein, a fellow at U.S. think tank the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who has researched the global expansion of AI surveillance. “It’s a deliberate investment prioritisation by the Chinese state to help flourish the [AI] sector, and we are now seeing the fruits of that.” “The drive to shape international standards . . . reflects longstanding concerns that Chinese representatives were not at the table to help set the rules of the game for the global Internet,” according to a 2018 report from U.S. think tank New America. “The Chinese government wants to make sure that this does not happen in other ICT spheres, now that China has become a technology power with a sizeable market and leading technology companies, including in AI.” The standards proposed have been criticized, however, for crossing over from technical specifications to policy ones, including use cases and data requirements.

1. Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S. Antitrust Movement,” December 15, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)